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 I 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the valuation effects of equity carve-outs 
occurring in Europe between the time period 1998 to 2011. The stock market reaction 
and operating performance of parent firms selling equity in a wholly owned subsidiary, 
known as equity-carve-out, are investigated. The methodology used in this paper is 
separated in the stock market effects examining the announcement effects of equity 
carve-outs and the operating performance effects methodology. According the stock 
market effects methodology short-run horizon effects are examined using both the 
Market Model Abnormal Return approach and the Market Adjusted Model Abnormal 
Return approach in order to find statistically significant abnormal returns. The empirical 
results show evidence for value creation and efficiency improvement in the short-run 
surrounding the announcement date. The findings supports the empirical results of 
previous research studies such as Langenbach (2001), but also empirical results on US 
data of Shipper and Smith (1986), Klein, Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991), Hand and 
Skantz (1998), Allen and McConnel (1998), Chemmanur and Paegalis (2000), and 
Haushalter and Mikkelson (2001). 
Additionally this paper provides empirical evidence in respect to the long-term stock 
market effect, examining Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return. Empirical results show a 
highly significant underperformance of parent stock in the first year after the carve-out, 
where in the subsequent year, two-year period following the event highly significant 
positive abnormal returns are found. Moreover, it is shown that parent firms are more 
profitable as result of the equity carve-out. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades a distinctive element of corporate activity in Europe is 
corporate restructuring. In the period from 1990 to 1998 the amount of exchange-listed 
disinvestments in Europe reached approximately 100 billion Euros1. Hoskisson and 
Turk (1990) defined corporate restructuring as "a major change in the composition of a 
firm`s asset combined with major change in its corporate strategy". The corporations 
restructure with the aim to create value for company shareholders by focusing on core 
business, disposing of divisions, eliminating negative synergies between unrelated 
business segments, creating pure-play companies easier to evaluate for investors and 
reducing debt.2 One important and popular portfolio restructuring tool that help 
corporations to increase value is an equity carve-out. Equity carve-outs are initial public 
offerings (IPO) of subsidiary equity where the parent firm usually keeps the majority 
ownership. In this context, the publicly traded parent company is "carving out" a part of 
it subsidiary`s outstanding shares through an IPO3. The recent explosion of equity 
separation started in the United States of America by focusing mostly on the high- 
technology sector, especially on units related to the internet.  
 
 From the academic point of view, the research object is extremely interesting 
because equity carve-outs combine two different elements of corporate restructuring 
mechanism. Foremost, this financial restructuring tool is a partial IPO which effects that 
a subsidiary firm goes public and raised its cash which affects immediately the parent 
firm. Second, an equity carve-out is similar to spin-offs and divestitures in the sense that 
the composition of the parents firm`s asset changes, and partially the control over the 
subsidiary is transferred from the parent firm to the shareholders. In fact, it is a 
hybridism which has captured in the past and captures furthermore researchers attention 
on which facet is expected to emerge, not only concerning value creation, but also 
concerning the motives for conducting carve-outs (rationale). 
 
In the finance literature there exist numerous studies which investigate the market 
reaction to divestiture announcements including equity carve-outs. Shipper and Smith 
(1986), Slovin,Sushka and Ferraro (1995), Allen (1998), Vijh (2002), Hulbert, Miles 
                                                 
1 See Glatzel (2003),Converted to € at the average of daily exchange rate from 1/1/1990 to 31/12/1988 
(approx. US$ /€1.25) 
2 Gaughan, P. A. (2002), p. 395-403. 
3
 Dr.V.R. Parthasarathy, p.1.  
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and Woolridge (2002) document that firms that undertake an equity carve-out 
experience positive average abnormal returns at the announcement date of carve-outs. 
For instance, Shipper and Smith (1986) report that the announcement of equity carve-
outs by parent firms is associated with an average adjusted positive return to the stock 
of the parent firm of about 2%.  
 
According to prior research the majority of the empirical work referring to this 
topic is based on US data, whereas the evidence in the European area is scarce. 
Motivated by this fact, this thesis emphasizes on the valuation effects of equity carve-
out transactions in Europe. This paper investigates the valuation effects of 60 equity 
carve-outs taking place between 1998 and 2011 in Europe. The analysis is based on the 
stock market activity, both in the short-term run and in the long-term run, as well as on 
the operating performance of the corresponding parent firms. That differs from the most 
existing research studies which focuses only on the announcement effect. Examining 
both, short-term stock market effects and long-term stock market effects, the stock 
market response of 60 European parent firms undertaking an equity carve-out are 
provided. In order to examine the effect of equity carve-out announcements two models 
are applied in the short-term horizon in order to calculate abnormal stock returns: the 
Market Model and the Market Adjusted Model. However, for the analysis in the long-
term horizon Buy-and-Abnormal Returns are measured for three different time 
windows: six months, one year and two years subsequent the event. According the 
operating performance effect analysis there are profitability, efficiency and growth 
measures selected in order to examine abnormal changes in firms` operating 
performance as impact of an equity carve-out. 
 
This research also indents to provide a better understanding of the characteristics of 
an equity carve-out, and the sources of value creation by outlining empirical results of 
prior research studies on US and European data. In addition, the research gives an 
overview of the key rationales and drivers for the carve-out ant its value creation. In this 
context the dissertation intends to answer the following research questions:  
• What are the characteristics of an equity carve-out? 
• What are the key rationales and drivers for the carve-out? 
• What are the sources of value creation? 
• What are the valuation effects, both in short and long term? 
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• Which are the main similarities and differences between the obtained 
empirical results of this research and the empirical results of prior 
research studies? 
 
The thesis is structured by focusing on the response to these research questions. 
Chapter 2 describes the fundamentals of equity carve-outs and the findings in literature. 
First, the definitions and characteristics are defined. Subsequently, an overview of 
reasons and motivations for carve-outs are given by focusing on empirical findings of 
prior studies. The key reasons such as the reduction of information asymmetries, 
efficiency hypothesis and fund raising are outlined. Subsequently, the sources of value 
creation, partly in accordance with the key reasons for an equity carve-out, are 
discussed. Finally, the announcement effects as well as the long-term stock market 
effects of US and European carve-outs are discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the sample selection and the methodology used in this research. 
After presenting the sample, the short-term effects stock market methodology and the 
long-term stock market methodology are described. Finally, the measures of operating 
performance and price multiples are presented. Chapter 4 focuses on the empirical tests 
and the empirical results of the 60 parent firms based on the methodology outlined in 
Chapter 3. According to the empirical findings, it is attempted to draw a line regarding 
the motivations and key drivers for equity carve-outs, as presented in Chapter 2, while 
on the same time present and explain the various valuation effects. Chapter 5 concludes 
by summarizing the results, outlining the valuation effects of European carve-outs and 
giving an outlook.  
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2. Literature Review  
In finance literature exist numerous studies which investigate the market reaction to 
divestiture announcements including equity carve-outs. Most prior studies on equity 
carve-outs focus on the stock performance of the parent company at time of equity 
carve-outs` announcement. According to the results of prior research there are two 
competing hypotheses, the asymmetric information and divestiture gains hypotheses 
postulating to predict the valuation effects of parent company`s stock performance. In 
this context the present chapter 2 intends to outline the fundamentals of carve-outs and 
to describe the motivation of carve-out transactions by focusing on the valuation effects. 
First the definition and characteristics of equity carve-outs are defined (Section 2.1.). 
Second, the reasons and motivation for such a restructuring tool are discussed (Section 
2.2.) by focusing on value creation (Section 2.2.1), information asymmetries (Section 
2.2.2.) and on the fund raising hypothesis (Section 2.2.3.). Third, the following section 
(Section 2.3.) discusses four sources of value creation: Increase of cash flows (Section 
2.3.1.), reduction of capital costs (Section 2.3.2.), disclosure of hidden reserves (2.3.3.) 
and the reduction of information asymmetries (Section 2.3.4.). Subsequently, the 
announcement effects of European equity carve-outs are presented (Section 2.4.) and 
empirical studies on long-term stock market effects are discussed next (Section 2.5.). 
2.1. Definition and Characteristics 
An equity carve-out is defined as a corporate restructuring tool where "a portion of a 
wholly owned subsidiary`s common stock is offered for sale to the public"4. According 
to this definition two different characteristics identify an equity carve-out. One 
characteristic is the public trading and the second one is the fact, that a carve-out affects 
a firm owned by another company.  
 
As an additional definition, an equity carve-out is a sale of a stake in a non-listed 
subsidiary by a publicly traded parent company, through an initial public offering. 
Michaely and Shaw (1995) define an equity carve-out as follows:"In the case of an 
accompanying stock issue with acquisition of new capital, the separation is called 
Equity carve-out." According to this definition, an equity carve-out is considered as a 
sale of shares with simultaneous raising of new capital. Shipper and Smith (1986) and 
Vijh (1999 and 2003) state that shares sold to the market can be shares owned by the 
parent firm or newly issued ones sold by the subsidiary itself. 
                                                 
4 Shipper, K. and Smith, A.  (1986) 
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There are five characteristics of the going public process:5 
• A previously private company is converted into a public company.  
• There is a possibility of a first-time participation by the public. 
• Published securities are regularly traded. 
• The number of shareholders increases. 
• The emission leads to a capital inflow for the subsidiary, the shareholders or 
both. 
 
Moreover, while prior to the carve-out the parent firm keeps the majority interest in 
the subsidiary, it is mostly common that even after the transaction the parent continues 
to own an ongoing interest mainly for tax and accounting purposes. If, for example, the 
parent`s ownership remains above 80%, it can continue to consolidate the subsidiary for 
both tax and accounting purposes. If it is less than 80% and more that 50%, the parent is 
allowed to consolidate the subsidiary only for accounting purposes but not for tax 
purposes. In the case of an ownership between 50% and 20%, the parent firm is obliged 
to use the equity method of accounting and below 20% the parent must use the cost 
method for its investment in the company.6 
  
In general, the parent-subsidiary relationship remains also after the equity carve-out. 
The following figure illustrates the change of disposal rights prior to and after the equity 
carve-out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Langenbach, W.(2001), p.230 f.  
6 Hunt, P. A. (2009), p.447. 
 6 
 
Figure 1: Shareholders - Company relation in the case of an equity carve-out 
 
Prior to the equity carve-out 
 
After the equity carve-out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
Equity carve-out transactions usually do not imply a 100% sale of the subsidiary as 
derived by figure 1, unlike spin-offs. Because of the characteristics of the equity carve-
out transactions, parents normally carve-out an entity with attractive business. This is 
due to the fact that new investors are required to acquire the subsidiary shares. In fact, it 
would be difficult to attract new investors for a poorly performing entity. Another 
characteristic which differentiates carve-outs from spin-offs is the tax efficiency. Carve-
outs are not really tax efficient, because the parent firm is obligated to tax any cash 
proceeds. As already mentioned in the previous paragraph, in the case of an ownership 
less than 80%, the parent company is no longer allowed to consolidate the subsidiary for 
tax purposes. This leads to the suggestion that tax efficiency is not the key driver for 
equity carve-outs.  
 
The term "equity carve-out" is partly used as a synonym for the term "spin-off", 
because of their similarities.7 Nevertheless, both terms have to be clearly separated. In 
the academic literature a spin-off is defined as follows: "A spin-off divides one firm into 
two; current shareholders receive a pro-rata distribution of separate equity claims on 
subset of the original firm`s net assets. Because continuity of ownership is maintained, 
any charge in value of owners` claims from the reorganization accrues to pre-spin-off 
shareholders."8 The shares of the subsidiary are transferred exclusively to the current 
shareholders of the parent firm. In fact, it means that shareholders´ parent stock receives 
                                                 
7 Hennings, R. (1995), p.6 ; Rechsteiner, U. (1995), p. 20. 
8 Shipper, K., Smith, A. (1983), p. 437. 
Shareholders Shareholders 
Parent firm 
Subsidiary firm 
Parent firm 
Subsidiary firm 
Shareholders 
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stock of the subsidiary on a pro-rata basis.9 The spin-off transaction leads to two or 
more independent firms resulting from the parent company, without capital inflow 
occurred by the divesting process. Unlike equity carve-outs, in the case of a spin-off 
there is no aim to sell the subsidiary stock to the public.  
 
In order to illustrate the differences between the two divesting tools Figure 2 
demonstrates the change of the disposal rights prior to and after the spin-off. 
 
Figure 2: Shareholders - Company relation in the case of a spin-off 
 
Prior to the spin-off 
 
After the spin-off 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
Whereas in the case of a spin-off the subsidiary stock is transferred to the existing 
shareholders, equity carve-outs are characterized by a capital inflow for both, the parent 
and subsidiary firm, occurred by the subsidiary`s IPO.  
 
The following table summarizes in comparison the characteristics of both 
restructuring tools based on equity separation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Shipper, K., Smith, A. (1983), p. 438. 
Shareholders Shareholders 
Parent firm 
Subsidiary firm 
Parent firm Subsidiary firm 
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Table 1: Comparison of Equity-Carve-Out and Spin-off 
 Equity Carve-Out Spin-off 
Description IPO of subsidiary Parents distributes shares 
of subsidiary to existing 
shareholders 
Degree of separation Generally partial Complete 
Reversible Dependent No 
Cash Proceeds Yes Yes (upstream dividend) 
Taxability Potential capital gains tax 
but avoidable depending on 
percentage carved-out, tax 
basis and business 
Generally tax-free 
Asset Transfer to 
New Company 
Yes Yes 
Consolidation Full tax consolidation if sell 
less than 20% 
No Consolidation 
Parent Control of 
New Company Cash 
Flows 
No (generally) No 
Board of Directors Separate Separate 
Source: L.E.K. Consulting Executive Insights Vol. III, Issue 1,p.1 
 
In general, an equity carve-out performs as financial tool for corporate restructuring 
and value enhancement10, which means that it combines characteristics of both 
restructuring and financing transactions. Equity carve-outs are a common applied 
divestment technique used by corporations to focus their core business. Parent firms 
choose to divest its subsidiary if they desire to increase efficiency through restructuring 
transactions and/ or in the case of generating cash by selling overvalued securities to the 
public through financial transactions. 
 
The next sections focus on motivation for equity carve-outs and the objectives of 
their most common approaches. 
2.2. Reasons and motivations for equity carve-outs 
In the context of one common approach, the parent firm is selling less than 20% of 
the subsidiary to the public and divesting the remainder in a tax-free spin-off afterwards. 
A spin-off is a different mechanism of restructuring creating a stand-alone public entity 
                                                 
10  Parthasarathy, V.R.  (not known), p. 1. 
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which is administratively as well as financially independent of the parent company.11 As 
in the case of an equity carve-out, public trading in such a subsidiary, a spin-off 
subsidiary, achieves a few objectives. One advantage is that the parent is able to 
highlight the value of the subsidiary and benefit from the value created. In addition, this 
approach leads to a chief advantage, as mentioned by Shipper and Smith (1986) and 
Gilson et al. (2001): The parent can focus on its business, expand its own multiple and 
get valued by the market independently. Simultaneously, the parent can bring out 
subsidiary's growth opportunities and its contribution to the parent, prior to the full 
carve-out. 
 
A second fairly common approach for the parent is to use the carve-out as financing 
source. Raising capital, as result of selling down a stake of the subsidiary to the public, 
represents a motivation for a carve-out transaction. As already mentioned above, in 
respect to the ownership structure, parents` ability to consolidate their subsidiaries for 
tax and accounting purposes can change. However, tax efficiency does not demonstrate 
a key reason behind equity crave-outs.  
 
It is very likely, that some parents undertake a carve-out in order to create a more 
efficient entity, known as efficiency rationale in the literature12. Efficiency can be 
achieved from many sources. Nanda (1991) states that a carve-out entity may improve 
access to capital markets, which represents a source to increased efficiency. According 
Shipper and Smith (1986) and Gilson et al. (2001) the separate financial statements of 
parent and subsidiary and the publicly traded carve-out equity unable investors to 
collect and profit from information. In this context, this is known as hidden value in 
parent firms, which get unlocked by the equity carve-out transaction. Moreover, 
according to Shipper, K. and Smith, A. (1986) a driving force can be to ameliorate the 
managerial contracts.  
 
An alternative motive for equity carve-outs is the financial rationale, which means 
that parent firms carve-out because the publicly traded subsidiary generates cash. This 
represents the most effective way of financing available for the parent company13. 
Using the carve-out entity as financial source, the parent firm takes advantage by 
reducing its debt. 
                                                 
11 Slovin, M.B. et al., p.91. 
12 Powers, E.A. (2003),  p. 32. 
13 Powers, E.A. (2003), p. 32. 
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The following table provides an overview of the motivations behind equity carve-
outs. 
 
Table 2: Overview of reasons behind equity carve-outs 
Motivation for equity carve-outs 
• increase focus on core business  
• highlight the value of the subsidiary 
• improve the autonomy of component business 
• improve the managerial incentive contracts 
• enhance the visibility of the component being divested14 
• increased information → information asymmetries 
• increased access to capital markets 
• fund raising 
• reduce debt 
 
The following sections emphasize on literature`s findings of value creation (Section 
2.2.1.), information asymmetries (Section 2.2.2), fund raising hypothesis (Section 2.2.3) 
as driving forces for equity carve-outs. 
2.2.1. Value creation  
A review of the literature shows that most researchers report a positive stock market 
reaction to equity carve-out announcement for parent firms, that presumes that carve-
outs are creating value. Table 3 provides an overview of the value creation during the 
announcement period documented in the literature. It is observed that the cumulative 
average positive abnormal returns range from 1.23 % to 2.75%.  
 
Table 3: Announcement period effects documented in literature for US data15 
Author Estimation period Time period Sample Event window Return 
Shipper and Smith (1986) [-280; -161] 1965-1983 76 [-4;0] 1.83% 
       [-13;0] 4.95% 
Klein, Rosenfeld and Beranek 
(1991) 
[-150; -50] 1966-1983 52 [-4;0] 2.75% 
       [-1;0] 1.06% 
Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro 
(1995) 
[-240; -121] 1980-1991 32  [0;+1] 1.23% 
       [-10; -1] 1.27% 
                                                 
14 Sudarsanam ,S. (2003), p.256. 
15
 Estimation period and event window are frequented on a daily basis. 
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Michaely and Shaw (1995)                         
(Master Limited Partnerships) 
[-109; -10] 1981-1988 28  [-2;0] 1.20% 
Hand and Skantz (1998) [-450; -251] 1981-1995 265 [-1; +1] 2.29% 
Allen and McConnell (1998) [-450; -250] 1978-1993 188  [-1; +1] 2.00% 
Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2000) 
[-245; -45] 1984-1985 
and 
1991-1998 
19  [-1; +1] 1.96% 
Haushalter and Mikkelson 
(2001) 
[-215; -15] 1994-1996 31  [-1; +1] 2.18% 
Vijh (2002) - 1980-1997 336  1.94% 
 Vijh (2002) [-500; -250] 1980-1997 336 [-1; +1] 1.93% 
Hulburt, Miles and 
Wooldridge (2002) 
  1981-1994 185 [-1; +1] 1.92% 
 
Shipper and Smith (1986) were the first who analyzed the effect of an equity carve-
out announcement. In their study they compare the market adjusted positive return to an 
equity carve-out announcement with the negative share price reaction to a seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) announcement. Shipper and Smith explained the difference 
between equity carve-outs and seasoned equity offerings by the seed the asymmetric 
information hypothesis and by divestiture gains hypothesis. According to table 3, the 
authors estimate abnormal returns for 76 equity carve-outs over the period 1963 by 
using the market model gathering stock prices on a daily base for the 280-day period 
prior to the announcement date. The returns are estimated for the 85-day period 
surrounding the announcement date. They find an average market adjusted positive 
return to the parent`s stock of 1.83% over the announcement period (-4 through day 0). 
Additionally, the positive market reaction does not get diluted during the 40-day period 
after the announcement day.  
 
In a study testing the divestiture gains and asymmetric information hypothesis by 
Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge (2002), it is shown that when the parent and the 
subsidiary are in the same industry the implications of both tested hypothesis on the 
effect of equity carve-out are ambiguous. By applying the adjusted returns method the 
authors find a positive adjusted return of 1.92% , which confirms the assumption that 
equity carve-outs create value. 
 
Obviously, tax advantages and facilitation of merger and acquisitions are important 
reasons why firms would divest their equity / ownership of a subsidiary16 , but in case of 
                                                 
16 Hite, G. and Owers J. (1983), p.421. 
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equity carve-outs tax purposes do not represent the key motivation for the divesting 
process.  
2.2.2. Information asymmetries  
Nanda (1991) , Nanda and Narayanan (1999) and Zuta (1999) are key references for 
explaining the implications of carve-outs based on reduced information asymmetries. 
Nanda (1991) has investigated why firms divest in general and stated that an equity 
carve-out represents good news "about the value of the existing equity in parent 
corporation"17 for investors. The author supports the findings of Shipper and Smith 
(1986)  according to the abnormal positive market adjusted return by its investigation.  
 
Also Schipper and Smith (1986) and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) examine 
information asymmetries as reason for equity carve-out in their study, arguing that an 
equity carve-out transaction increases the quantity and quality of conveyed information 
about subsidiary´s and parent`s activity available to all public companies. Moreover, 
they document that equity carve-outs create "pure-play stocks" attracting new investors 
to generate a better knowledge of subsidiaries business due to the existing information 
transparency. The positive market reaction on the announcement day is explained by the 
capture of unlocked value of the subsidiary which differently is uncovered in a 
diversified company. Therefore the reduction of information asymmetries plays a 
significant role for the value creation occurred by carve-outs. 
 
The results of the research study of Gilson, Healy, Noe and Palepu (1998) and 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) according the reduction of the information deficit are in 
line with the findings of the previous outlined findings in past literature. The authors 
also document that an equity carve-out  reduces the information asymmetries due to the 
fact that an increased number of market participants overview subsidiary`s activity, 
including analysts who focus more on the subsidiary`s activity than on parent`s 
business.  
2.2.3. Fund raising hypothesis 
In a divestiture, the initial public offering of the subsidiary enables the creation of 
shareholders` value by serving a number of purposes. This section concentrates on the 
purposes of raising capital. Both, parent and subsidiary, raise funds by the IPO 
transaction. The cash proceeds raised by carve-out transactions can be used to pay down 
                                                 
17 Nanda (1991), p.1717 
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debt, to finance activities like investment purposes of the parent and/or the subsidiary or 
to be paid out as a dividend. Moreover, the funds raised allow to finance the growth of 
either firm, reducing the need to assume additional debt which represents the equity 
carve-out as financing source. Therefore both, the parent and the subsidiary, have the 
opportunity to bring efficiencies to their respective balance sheet because of the carve-
out.  
 
In the literature there is found evidence which strongly supports that the main reason 
for conducting equity carve-outs is fund raising in the capital market. Allen and 
McConnel (1998) test empirically in their study a managerial discretion hypothesis of 
equity carve-outs where managers of the parent firm undertake equity carve-outs only in 
the case of limited capital sources. In order words, parents which are capital constrained 
are reluctant to carve out their subsidiary. The empirical findings show evidence for the 
managerial discretion hypothesis, which defines the equity carve-out as a financing 
solution supporting the need of cash flow as main motive for carve-outs. 
 
Frank and Harden (2001) also find evidence that supports the fund raising 
hypothesis as main motive for conducting carve-outs. In their research they compare 
equity carve-outs and spin-offs focusing on corporate restructuring where the findings 
support the empirical results of Allen and McConnel (1998) suggesting that parent firms 
carve-out because of their cash needs. Also Powers (2002) finds evidence that supports 
the need of cash as main motive for carve-outs. Frank and Harden (2001) and Powers 
(2002) show that in a corporate restructuring process, corporations with poor 
performance choose the equity carve-out as restructuring tool while other corporations 
select spin-offs.  
 
Moreover, Vijh (2002) argues that the main motive for equity carve-outs is fund-
raising. In this research two different hypotheses are investigated: first, the "financing 
strategy hypothesis" is present in the case of raising funds in order to pay dividends, to 
pay down parent or subsidiary debt, to support working capital needs or to finance other 
activities except subsidiary investment; second, the "investment strategy hypothesis" 
occurs when cash-inflows is raised to finance subsidiary`s investment opportunities. 
Both examined hypotheses are based on the proceeds` destination. 
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According to the empirical findings of Schipper and Smith (1986), Allen (1998a), 
Powers (2001), and Frank and Harden (2001) parent firms carve out their subsidiary 
because the carved-out subsidiaries are more profitable and have higher growth than 
their parent firms. Thereby the authors conclude that carve-outs are undertaken in order 
to finance the growth opportunities of the carved-out entity. Therefore, there is also 
evidence that support another hypothesis, in fact the investment strategy hypothesis 
where the carve-out transaction is used as financial source especially in the case where 
subsidiaries act in high growth industries as shown by Schipper and Smith (1986) and 
Vijh (2002). 
 
Hand and Skantz (1999) and Powers (2002) provide stronger evidence supporting 
fund raising as the main reason for conducting carve-out by investigating the presence 
of market-timing. In accordance to Power (2002) carved-out subsidiaries tend to be 
overvalued by the stock market. The author argues that the entire market response to 
carved-out entities is a proof that fund raising is the main motive for conducting carve-
outs. Thus, while it is not necessary that corporations undertake carve-outs with a clear 
purpose for cash proceeds, they nevertheless profit from the subsidiaries' over valuation. 
2.3. Sources of value creation 
The sources of value creation can be derived from the reason and motives for 
conducting equity carve-outs as mentioned in the previous part (Section 2.2.). As 
shown, in finance literature there exists evidence which supports the key drivers for an 
equity carve-out. The present section sheds light on these key drivers as sources of 
value creation occurred by carve-out transactions. 
 
Generally, the value enhancement belongs to the primary corporate goals, so that the 
management follows strategies, both individual business unit strategies and global 
corporate strategies, to increase the value of the company. Therefore it can be concluded 
that investment or disinvestment decisions are based on the value enhancement. The 
following part focus on the sources of value creation for parent firms due to the initial 
public offering of the subsidiary. In the context of an equity carve-out Hennings (1995) 
defines four different sources of value creation.  
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Figure 3: Opportunities for enterprise value enhancement in the context of an equity carve-out 
 
In accordance to Hennings (1995), p. 129 
2.3.1. Increase of cash flows 
The amount of increased cash flows due to an equity carve-out depends au fond on 
the consolidation purpose of the parent firm (balance sheet placement), the portion of 
shares sold and the achieved issue price for the shares sold in an initial public offering 
transaction.  
 
If the sale of subsidiary`s shares takes place from the parent`s investment portfolio, 
the sales revenues affect directly the parent firm. Otherwise, if the equity carve-out 
occurs due to subsidiary`s capital increase without cum-rights of parent firm, so 
increases only the subsidiary`s equity in the amount of issue volume (Face value plus 
premium).18 In this case the cash flow of the parent firm is not affected.  
 
However, there exists also a mixed procedure of both described processes. In this 
context, the capital increase in the subsidiary is connected with the sale of parent`s 
shares. Sales revenue of the subsidiary`s IPO accrues to the parent where the sales 
revenue arises as result from the issue price multiplied by the number of shares sold. 
Both components affect directly the generated cash flow.  
2.3.2. Reduction of capital costs 
As already stated in the previous section, an equity carve-out can be used as 
financing source. The parent company raises its capital by undertaking an equity carve-
out. From the perspective of the parent, the price-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) is of 
particular importance because it represents the relation of the price paid for a share 
                                                 
18 Langenbach, W. (2001), p. 234. 
Increase of 
cash flows 
Reduction of 
cost of capital 
Disclosure of 
hidden reserves 
Reduction of information 
asymmetries 
Sources of value creation 
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relative to the annual profit earned by the company per share.19 Under the terms of 
capital of cost reduction parent firms shall prefer to undertake a carve-out if the 
subsidiary documents a higher P/E ratio than the parent firm.20 This is observable in the 
case where the subsidiary belongs to a more profitable industry, an industry 
characterized by high P/E ratios and growth opportunities, in comparison with the 
parent`s industry.  
 
Furthermore, the divestiture process reduces the risk of financial resources` 
misallocation within the company. This automatically leads to an improvement in the 
risk structure and risk profile of the company.21  
2.3.3. Disclosure of hidden reserves  
In the framework of a carve-out transaction, hidden reserves are disclosed. Hidden 
reserves are shares of equity capital which are not listed in the company`s balance sheet. 
As part of the restructuring of the company there is most likely a transfer of a portion of 
parent`s asset to the subsidiary. This transfer leads necessarily to a revaluation and 
economically reasonable classification of assets, liabilities and expense accruals. 
Although shareholders are owning partly hidden reserves, these are not reflected 
adequately in the share price because hidden reserves are not identifiable for external 
analysts. Therefore, a disclosure of hidden reserves can have a positive impact on the 
P/E ratio and thus also on the stock market performance. An additional advantage is that 
the disclosure of hidden reserves deprives management`s possibility to hide future 
losses or negative income changes by using hidden reserves. Due to this fact the 
transparency of management`s performance increases, which represents an additional 
advantage for investors.  
2.3.4. Reduction of information asymmetries 
The reduction of information asymmetries represents a significant source of value 
creation as discussed in section 2.2.2.. Langenbach (2001) argues that an equity carve-
out reduces the information asymmetries between the subsidiary and actors in the 
capital market by improving the actuality, quality and quantity of subsidiary`s 
information.  
 
                                                 
19 Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio), Investopedia, retrieved 2012-03-09 
20 Mathesius, J. (2003), p.63 
21 Hornung, K., Wullenkord, A. (2001), p.60. 
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The stock market daily evaluates stock listed companies which increase their 
transparency where in the case of a carved-out transaction this increases considerable 
the transparency of the corresponding parent and subsidiary firm for evaluation 
purposes. This daily stock evaluation is represented in their listed prices available to all 
participants such as shareholders holding an interest in the subsidiary.  
 
There exist several statutory requirements regarding the improvement of supply in 
capital markets which have to be fulfilled as part of an equity carve-out. Some of that 
statutory requirements are the discovery of financial statements for a newly formed 
corporation, extensive disclosure requirements within the context of an IPO.22 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the quality as well as the actuality of information of 
the participating companies improve in the course of an equity carve-out. Furthermore, 
the carve-out leads to an improvement of information`s quantity. 
 
An additional source of value creation in the context of reduced information 
asymmetries is given by the disclosure of hidden reserves, depriving management`s 
possibility to hide future losses or negative income changes by using hidden reserves, as 
described by Hennings (1995).  
2.4. Announcement effect for European carve-outs  
Unlike the literature on the announcement effect for US carve-outs, outlined in 
Table 4 (Section 2.2.1) , the announcement period effect for European carve-outs has 
not been broadly tested. Table 3 provides some research studies on European equity 
carve-outs analyzing the announcement period return. 
Table 4: Announcement period effects of European carve-outs23 
Author Country Time frame Sample Event window CAR 
Ahlers (1997) Germany 1984-1996 23 [-10;+10] -1.0% 
Bühner (1998)  USA and EU 1993-1997 10 day 0 -0,2% 
Gibbs (2000) EU 1999-2000 47 [-1,+1] 
[-30,+30] 
2.5% 
2.9% 
Elsas  and Löffler (2001) Germany  1984-2000 39 day 0 
[-10,+10]  
1.1% 
4.1% 
Langenbach (2001) Germany 1984-1999 32 [-1;+1] 
[-5,+5] 
1.4% 
3.1% 
Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova  (2004) 
EU 1987-2000 156 [-1,+1] 2.6% 
Gleason, Madura and 
Pennathur (2006) 
EU 1981-2001 129 [-1,+1] -1.07% 
Source: Rüdisüli, R., Amden SG (2005),p.71f. 
                                                 
22 Mathesius, J. (2003), p.65 
23
 Event window frequented on a daily basis. 
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Comparing the announcement effects of European carve-outs in Table 4 with those 
of US carve-outs outlined in Table 3, the announcement effect seems to be similar. 
Excluding Ahlers (1997) and Bühner (1998) the averaged cumulative abnormal returns 
for the announcement of equity carve-outs are positive, observing averaged cumulative 
positive abnormal returns range from 1.1 % to 4.1%. The first five research studies are 
characterized by a lower number of transactions compared to the US research studies, 
which leads to limited evidence. Nevertheless the study of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004) is in line with previous US studies regarding the number of transactions. They 
found an averaged cumulative abnormal return of 2.6%, which is similar to the findings 
of US studies especially of Hans and Skantz (1998), Allen and McConnel (1998) with 
returns of 2.29% and 2.00% respectively. According to Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004) stronger announcement effects are observable the longer the event window, 
because information processing takes place not only after the announcement day but 
also prior to it. 
  
Ahlers (1997) documents a cumulative average abnormal return over the 20-day 
event window of -1.0% where Bühner (1998) records also a negative cumulative 
average abnormal return on the announcement day of 0.2%.  
 
Another study of value creation of European carve-outs represents the research 
study of Gleason, Madura and Pennathur (2006) , where 129 equity carve-outs between 
1981 and 2000 are analyzed. The authors examine and compare the effects of parent 
firms who reacquire the subsidiary firm with no future reacquisition. They find a 
negative and insignificant market reaction in the case of reacquisition. Parent firms earn 
a significant averaged CAR of -1.07% over the three-day period. 
2.5. Long-term performance effects 
In the past literature also the long-term stock market performance are documented as 
an important part of analysis signaling that measuring abnormal returns only around the 
announcement day is not sufficient in the sense of capturing the total value created by 
equity carve-outs. Also in the long-term stock market performance research studies on 
US data are broader than on European carve-outs. Therefore the following table 
provides some research studies on equity carve-outs focusing the parent`s and 
subsidiary`s long-term stock market performance.  
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Table 5: Long-term Stock Market Effects24 
Author Time frame Sample Object analyzed Event window Return 
Vijh (1999): BHARs 
adjusted by market index 
1981-1995 628 Parent 
 
Subsidiary 
[0, +12] 
[0, +36] 
[0, +12] 
[0, +36] 
-5.8% 
-4.3% 
1.3% 
-2.9% 
Vijh (1999): BHARs 
adjusted by size & B/M 
1981-1995 628 Parent 
 
Subsidiary 
[0, +12] 
[0, +36] 
[0, +12] 
[0, +36] 
-0.6% 
-0.7% 
5.2% 
8.0% 
Vijh (1999): CARs 
adjusted by size & 
industry 
1981-1995 628 Parent 
Subsidiary 
[0, +36] 
[0, +36] 
-12.6% 
-5.7% 
 
Vijh (1999): CARs 
adjusted by size & B/M 
1981-1995 628 Parent 
Subsidiary 
[0, +36] 
[0, +36] 
-3.0% 
5.0% 
Anslinger, Bonini, and  
Patsalos-Fox (2000) 
1988-1996 46 
67 
Parent 
Subsidiary 
[0, +24] 
[0, +24] 
5.2% 
12.8% 
Annema, Fallon, and 
Goedhart (2001) 
1990-2000 200 Parent 
Subsidiary 
[0, +24] 
[0, +24] 
-21.5% 
-10.0% 
Powers (2001) 1981-1998 181 Parent 
Subsidiary 
[0, +12] 
[0, +12] 
-7.7% 
-8.0% 
Gleason, Madura and 
Pennathur (2006) 
1981-2001 91 
 
112 
Parent  
 
Subsidiary 
[0, +12] 
[0, +18] 
[0, +12] 
[0, +18] 
-23.19% 
-25.65% 
-16.15% 
-24.44% 
Source: Own preseantation 
 
According the outlined research studies subsidiaries perform better than their 
parents in the first twelve months after the carve-out. It seems that the subsidiaries 
outperform the market and the matched firms. Generally, the long-term stock 
performance of carve-out firms are better than the one of their parents in all the 
investigated event windows. Referring to the empirical results of Annema, Fallon and 
Goedhart (2001) subsidiaries and parent firms mostly destroyed value in the 1990s.  
 
The first who analyzed the long-term stock market performance of equity carve-outs 
in the USA were Klein, Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991). They investigated 52 carve-outs 
from 1996 to 1983 finding that the equity carve-out combines two events. The carve-out 
is the first event followed by either selling of the parent`s subsidiary stock or 
reacquiring the subsidiary`s stock. In the case of divesting parent`s remaining interest 
the authors find positive abnormal returns over both event periods. Also the 
                                                 
24 Event window is frequented on a monthly basis. 
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reacquisition of subsidiary`s stock as next stage after the equity carve-outs yields 
positive returns.25 
 
Vijh (1999) examines the long-term stock market effects of 628 carve-out 
transactions occurring from 1981 to 1995 by using various approaches and benchmarks 
(see Table 4): Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs), CARs, three factor Fama-
French Model (1993). The author uses as benchmarks a value-weighted market index, 
size and book-to-market (B/M), industry and size, also earnings-to-price matching and 
parent firms. Using the BHAR and CAR approaches subsidiaries yield higher returns 
over each investigated time period after the carve-out than their parents. Parent firms 
earn negative returns in each event window resulting that they destroy value. 
Calculating CARs, the subsidiaries result in outperforming the three selected 
benchmarks and their parents by earning 5.0% (> -3.0% parent return) and -5.7% (> -
12.6% parent return).  
 
Anslinger, Bonini and Patsalos-Fox (2000) explore the long-term stock market 
performance of 46 parents and 67 subsidiaries taking place between 1991 and 1995. 
They analyzed the performance two years after the transaction and found that both 
parent and subsidiaries outperform their market index by 5.2% and respectively 12.8%. 
Also this research study shows that subsidiary stocks perform better in the long-run than 
the parent stock in average.  
 
Annema, Fallon and Goedhart (2001) analyze 200 carve-outs worldwide taking 
place in approximately ten years. The findings of this research differ from the ones of 
the studies outlined in Table 4 due to the fact that in two years after the transaction both 
entities, parent and subsidiary, destroy value. Subsidiaries earn higher averaged BHARs 
of -10.0% than parents, yielding -21.5% in the two years following the transaction. 
  
In another study Power (2001) reports an underperformance of 181 carve-outs from 
1981 to 1998 in the first year after the transaction. Parent firms earn average BHARs of 
-7.7%, where the underperformance of subsidiaries is much stronger, -8.0%. 
 
Gleason, Madura and Pennathur (2006) analyze BHARs for parents and carve-out 
units that are later reacquired by the parents. Returns documented in Table 4 represent 
                                                 
25 Rüdisüli, R., Amden SG (2005), p.80f. 
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the long-term stock performance of the entire parent and subsidiary sample. It is shown 
that both parents and subsidiaries fare poorly in the subsequent months after the carve-
out event. In the twelve months after the carve-out parents yield a average BHAR of -
23.19% where subsidiaries earn BHARs of -16.15% for the same event period. In fact, 
subsidiaries earn significant higher BHARs than parent firms over all investigated event 
windows. According to their findings the authors argue that carve-outs are not 
necessarily conducted for efficiency improvement. 
 
In the context of long-term operating performance there is no empirical evidence 
found in the existing literature of carve-outs in Europe. Also empirical evidence on the 
long-term operating performance of US carve-outs is marginal. 
 
Michaely and Shaw (1995) examine the long-term operating performance for 28 
carve-out parents and 51 subsidiaries documenting a decline of the median return on 
assets (ROA) of -0.04% for the parents and of -5.01% for the carved-out subsidiaries 
from the year prior to the year after the equity carve-out. The authors support a slimly 
increase in parent`s leverage, defined as total debt to total assets, and a subsidiary`s 
decrease in indebtedness level. 
  
Powers (2003) analyzes 181 equity carve-outs documenting that the mean ROA is 
relative stable over the subsequent five years where the operating performance of the 
carved-out entities declines compared to the industry. In the year of transaction the 
subsidiaries outperform the industry respecting the mean (median) ROA which is 
documented at 17.2% (15.9%). There are similar findings according operating 
performance measures such as sales and earnings growth rates, profit margin and capital 
expenditures. The author documents that parent firms systematically underperform their 
matching sample. Moreover parent firms have significantly more leveraged than the 
matching sample. 
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3. Sample selection and Methodology 
Chapter 3 describes the sample selection and the methodology used for the analysis 
of the data. The subsequent section presents the selection of the working sample. The 
following section (Section 3.2.) describes the stock market effect methodology in the 
short-run (Section 3.2.1) and in the long-run (Section 3.2.2.). Subsequently, the 
measures of operating performance are discussed (Section 3.3 and Section 3.3.1.). 
3.1. Sample selection 
The sample for the study is chosen based upon several criteria. To identify European 
equity carve-outs the Thomson`s SDC database is searched through public offerings 
flagged as "spin-offs" during the period January 1,1998 through December 31, 2011 in 
Europe. The database defines a "spin-off" as "shares sold to the public (IPO), where the 
parent company held from 50% to 100% of the shares outstanding prior to the IPO"26. 
This definition given by Thomson corresponds to the academic literature`s definition 
"equity carve-out" given by Schipper and Shmith (1986). Subsequently, the results from 
the initial search are cross-referenced with information on all initial public offerings 
generated for the same time period in order to find equity carve-outs entering the IPO 
market over the same period. The sample excludes spin-offs defined by the academic 
literature. Additionally, searching through the Merger & Acquisition Thomson ONE`s 
database, equity carve-outs are identified by public offerings flagged as "equity carve-
outs" in Europe over the investigated period, where the search focus only target 
companies, in this case the subsidiary firm, with the public status flagged as 
"subsidiary". Thomson Financial`s "equity carve-out" flag is defined as a sale of new 
company`s shares to the public via public offering. The database tracks equity carve-
outs in the case of privatization and only if they represent 100% of the target shares.27 
By this way additional equity carve-outs are identified. The carved-out entities are also 
cross-referenced with the identified IPOs in Europe. Furthermore, information of two 
more equity carve-outs transactions occurred in Portugal are taken from a research 
paper entitled "Equity carve-outs: restructuring or financing? The case of Portugese 
TMT carve-outs"28.  
                                                 
26 SDC FAQ, http://findb.aalto.fi/faq/sdc.html, retrieved 10.03.2012, (see appendix) 
27 http://mergers.thomsonib.com/DealsWeb/help/def.htm 
28 Padrao,R, Farinha, J. (zear published not known) 
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In fact, only common stock issues and no multiple securities such as bonds or stocks 
with warrants are included. Parent firms which are not listed at least 210 days prior the 
subsidiary IPO are excluded from the sample29, because of the used methodology. 
 
The first spin-off sample contains 548 transactions, which is matched with a sample 
of 9,106 IPOs to identify the European equity carve-outs entering the IPO market. The 
matched sample under all mentioned conditions contains 83 European equity carve-
outs. Moreover, the search for equity carve-outs in Thomson`s Merger & Acquisition 
database resulted in 8 transactions excluding privatization carve-outs. Firms with a lack 
of historical stock performance in Bloomberg and finance yahoo database are also 
excluded. This resulted in a working sample of 60 European carve-outs as shown in 
Panel A of Table 6. 
 
Panel A lists additionally the absolute frequency and relative frequency of the 60 
equity carve-outs by year. As shown approximately 45% of the sample Equity carve-
outs took place between 1998 and 2002, where in the years 2000 and 2001 the majority 
of the transactions are represented. Thus, about 55% of the European carve-outs took 
place between the years 2003 and 2011. A heavy carve-out activity is obvious in 2000. 
Referring to the sample the majority of equity carve-outs concentrates in the years 2000, 
2001 , 2007 and 2011. According to the distribution by country shown in Panel A the 
most carve-out transactions took place in the United Kingdom with 16 carve-outs , 
26,67% of the total, followed by Germany with 9 transactions, 15% of the total. Also in 
the Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Norway, are counted comparatively numerous 
equity carve-outs. 
 
Panel B lists the descriptive reporting the industry classification of parents and 
subsidiaries obtained by Bloomberg database. The distribution of parent firm by the 
industry indicates that the parent firms of the working sample have the most firms in 
Telecommunications, Commercial Services and Electric industries. Carved-out 
subsidiaries are more common in Oil&Gas, Real Estate, Commercial Services, Media 
and Entertainment, Auto Manufactures and Chemicals industries.  
 
 
                                                 
29 This is due to the fact that the applied methodology (see Section 3.2) requires for the estimation 
period historical stock prices over the time period [-210,-11]. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Construction and Selection of the Sample  
  Spin-off IPO 
European firms on Thomson One`s database (1997-2011) 548 9106 
Equity carve-out 
Matched sample 83 
Firms searched as equity carve-out with subsidiary status (no 
privatization) 8 
Equity carve-out transaction took by research paper 2 
Firms with missing data or not listed in Bloomberg (33) 
  
Final Sample  60 
Distribution by year: Equity carve-out  % of Total 
1998 4 6.67% 
1999 5 8.33% 
2000 11 18.33% 
2001 6 10.00% 
2002 1 1.67% 
2003 2 3.33% 
2004 3 5.00% 
2005 1 1.67% 
2006 4 6.67% 
2007 7 11.67% 
2008 5 8.33% 
2009 1 1.67% 
2010 4 6.67% 
2011 6 10.00% 
Distribution by country: Equity carve-out  % of Total 
Belgium 1 1.67% 
Denmark 1 1.67% 
Finland 2 3.33% 
France 5 8.33% 
Germany 9 15.00% 
Italy 3 5.00% 
Netherlands 2 3.33% 
Norway 6 10.00% 
Portugal 3 5.00% 
Spain 2 3.33% 
Sweden 8 13.33% 
Switzerland 2 3.33% 
United Kingdom 16 26.67% 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
Panel B: Industry Classification 
Industry of Parent 
Number of 
Firms 
% of 
Total Industry of Subsidiary 
Number of 
Firms 
% of 
Total 
Telecommunication 5 8.33% Oil & Gas 6 10.00% 
Commercial Services 4 6.67% Real Estate 5 8.33% 
Electric 4 6.67% Commercial Services 5 8.33% 
Pharmaceuticals  4 6.67% Media and Entertainment 4 6.67% 
Oil&Gas Services 3 5.00% Auto Manufacturers 4 6.67% 
Chemicals 3 5.00% Chemicals 4 6.67% 
General Industrials 3 5.00% Transportation 3 5.00% 
Oil & Gas  3 5.00% Software 3 5.00% 
Food 3 5.00% General Industrials 2 3.33% 
Miscellaneous Manufactur 2 3.33% Internet 2 3.33% 
Insurance  2 3.33% Materials 2 3.33% 
Transportation 2 3.33% Pharmaceuticals  2 3.33% 
Media 2 3.33% Retail 2 3.33% 
Auto Manufacturers 2 3.33% Telecommunications 2 3.33% 
Mining 2 3.33% 
Water and Waste 
Management 2 3.33% 
Healthcare 2 3.33% Oil&Gas Services 1 1.67% 
Retail 2 3.33% Mining 1 1.67% 
Computers  2 3.33% Insurance 1 1.67% 
Iron/Steel 1 1.67% Water 1 1.67% 
Airlines 1 1.67% Financials 1 1.67% 
Water 1 1.67% Healthcare-Products 1 1.67% 
Materials 1 1.67% Consumer Staples 1 1.67% 
Investment Companies 1 1.67% Environmental Control 1 1.67% 
Engineering&Construction 1 1.67% Biotechnology 1 1.67% 
Real Estate 1 1.67%  Semiconductors 1 1.67% 
Distribution/Wholesale 1 1.67% Electrical Compo&Equip 1 1.67% 
Financials 1 1.67% Electric 1 1.67% 
Software 1 1.67%       
 
3.2. Stock Market Effects Methodology 
This paper applies the classical event study methodology30, where financial market 
data are used in order to measure the impact of the equity carve-out event on the firm 
value. In the short-term analysis the impact of the equity carve-out can be examined by 
using the stock prices over a relatively short time period of [-10,+10] days around the 
announcement date. For this purpose historical stock prices are downloaded from 
Bloomberg database for the working sample. This paper uses the stock market price in 
the short-term announcement effect analysis because of the rationality in the market 
                                                 
30Classical event study methodology is described by MacKinlay (1997) 
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place where the stock prices reflect immediately the effects of an event. In addition, to 
the short-term effect analysis the paper examines a long-term announcement effects, 
because there might be also long-term impact on the stock market occurred by the 
equity carve-out event. 
 
Section 3.2.1. explains the short-horizon event study method where in Section 3.2.2. 
the applied methodology for the long-horizon event study are outlined. In section 3.2.1. 
three models estimating abnormal returns are presented. For the long-term analysis Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for 6, 12 and 24 months are applied. Moreover, 
statistical tests are used for significance for both horizons.  
 
The purpose of this stock market effect study is to test whether or not empirical 
observations of parents` stock behavior conform with the behavior predicted by one of 
the applied models conditional on the equity carve-out event. 
3.2.1. Short-term event study method 
In the short-horizon analysis there are two approaches used in the analysis of daily 
abnormal returns: the Market-Model Abnormal Returns and the Market-Adjusted 
Abnormal Returns. 
 
The first model used to calculate abnormal returns, the Market Model, estimates the 
systematic risk of each parent firm relative to the corresponding market index. 
According to Brown and Warner (1985) it is a powerful and a well specified model 
under a variety of conditions. Further, MacKinlay (1997) also supports the explanatory 
power of the Market Model by comparing the limited gains from more sophisticated 
multi-factor derivations of the Market Model. In order to calculate abnormal returns 
using the Market Model, expected returns have to be estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Firstly, we have to estimate the Market Model equation by OLS using 
the relevant data from the estimation window [-210,-11], whereby the date of 
announcement equals day zero : 
 
    Rj = αj + βj Rmt ,                                                                                            (1) 
where, 
  
       Rj    is the estimated log-return on each firm j over the estimation window 
           Rmt  is the estimated log-return on the market index 
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      αj & βj     are the OLS parameters estimated for each security over  -210 through   
  -11 days relative to the announcement day. 
 
Secondly, the daily abnormal returns applying the Market Model Abnormal Returns 
are  given by the following equation: 
 
    MMARjt= Rjt - Rj                       (2) 
                                                                            
    MMARjt= Rjt - (αj + βj Rmt)
31
           (3) 
where, 
 MMARjt   is the Market Model Abnormal Returns on security i over time t 
         Rj     is the log-return on each firm j over the estimation window 
             Rmt    is the log-return on the market index 
     αj & βj      are the OLS parameters estimated for each security over -210 through   
    -11 days relative to the announcement day. 
 
The second model used, Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns (MAAR), defines the 
abnormal return as the excess return on a security j adjusted on its listed market index 
over the same time t. The characteristic of this model is its simplicity in implementation 
and interpretation. The Market Adjusted Model is assuming that the systematic risk of 
each security and the market is identical, claimed by Brown and Warner (1980). MAAR 
is calculated as follows: 
 
    MAARjt= Rjt - Rmt,                                                                               (4) 
 where,  
 MAARjt      is the Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns on security i over time t 
         Rj      is the log-return on each firm j over the estimation window 
             Rmt    is the log-return on the market index. 
 
The length of the event period is for both models identical, [-10,+10].  The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event period are calculated by summing 
the daily abnormal returns in the case of both applied models.  
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 Bucheim, A. et al (2001), p. 22. 
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In order to test the significance for abnormal returns the student`s t-test is used. If 
the null hypothesis is supported the test statistic follows a student`s t distribution. 
Commonly, it is applied when the test statistic follows a normal distribution. In this 
context, the student`s t-statistic tests for statistical significance, by testing the null 
hypothesis, that the calculated abnormal returns, by the applied models, are zero over 
the event window [-10, +10].  The equation for the t-student is given by: 
 
   test statistic= CARpt /σ (ARpt) * T
1/2                                          (5) 
where, 
 CARpt         is the cumulative abnormal return on a portfolio of N events   
        for a given time period t32 
 σ (ARpt)     is the standard deviation of abnormal returns for a given time   
        period t. 
 
The standard deviation, or well the variance, is calculated as shown by Brown and 
Warner (1985) in the case of the Market Adjusted Model. The calculation of variance in 
the Market Model differs. Firstly, MMARs for each security are calculated over the 
estimation window [-210,-11]. Secondly, the standard deviation of the averaged 
MMARs on the portfolio are calculated for each day in the estimation period. Thirdly, 
the standard deviation of the averaged MMARs  are used and plugged in equation (5) in 
order to calculate the t-student test statistic for the Market Model, as shown as follows: 
 
   test statistic= CARpt /σ * T
1/2                                                     (6) 
  
3.2.2. Long-term event study method                                                                                                           
The most commonly used methodology for long-term analysis is the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns. Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) and Inkenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermalen 
(1995) show that the long-term effect analysis is necessary because the valuation effects 
of restructuring may occur also in the long-horizon and not only at time of the 
announcement.  
 
                                                 
32
 CARs are calculated for every day through the event window. 
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In this paper BHARs are computed using daily data for 125, 250 and 500 days 
(6, 12 and 24 months) one day post the announcement day of the equity carve-out as the 
difference between the compounded actual return of the parent and the compounded 
return of the market. 
                
0 0
[1 ] [1 ]
T T
it it mt
t t
BHAR R R
= =
= + − +∏ ∏                                                    (7) 
where, 
             it
R  is the time t log-return on security i 
     mt
R  is the time t log-return on the market index . 
 
Also in the long-term horizon analysis BHARs are tested for the statistical 
significance. Firstly, the t-statistics for the different normal return estimation procedures 
are computed. Due to the fact that market returns are used as reference portfolio in order 
to estimate normal returns, the distribution of abnormal returns in the long-runs are 
positively skewed. This results in misspecified t-statistics, for which reasons the 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic33 is calculated as shown by equation (8): 
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N      is the number of events in the sample 
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tABHAR  and ( )tBHARσ  are the sample mean and cross-sectional standard 
deviation of buy-and-hold returns for the sample of N events. 
 
                                                 
33 see Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo, (2004) 
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Although this model faced a lot of criticism the chief advantage is that BHARs 
simulate most accurately the effect of an investigated event on an portfolio of securities 
because of compounding.34 
3.3. Operating Performance Effects Methodology 
.In this section the long-run operational performance effects based on the carve-out 
transaction are examined. The following part discusses which operating performance 
measures are selected in order to analyze abnormal changes in a three-years period 
beginning from the year prior to the equity carve-out to one year subsequent the event. 
3.3.1. Measures of Operating Performance  
There are several measures of operating performance in the literature. Following the 
measures of operating performance used by Barber and Lyon (1996), this paper 
measures profitability by using return on assets (ROA35), earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and return on equity (ROE). Leverage is 
measured by the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. 
Moreover, asset growth is used as growth measure.  
 
All the financial statement data or ratios are downloaded from the Bloomberg 
database. The change in profitability, leverage and asset growth is computed by 
examining the three-year period, [-1,0,+1], beginning from the year prior the equity 
carve-out, denoted as year - 1, to the year after the transaction, denoted + 1, where year 
0 symbolizes the carve-out event. Firstly, the corresponding measures are averaged in 
order to compute the abnormal change in ROA, EBITDA, Total Debt/Total Assets and 
Asset growth for the event windows [-1,0], [0,+1] and [-1,+1]. To assess whether there 
is an abnormal change in operating performance based on annual-frequency, there is 
also the median of operating performance for the relevant investigated time period 
presented, where the median values are less sensitive than the average values.36 
 
Using the forecasting and econometric analysis software EViews two tests for 
equality are computed: test for equality for mean and median. According the first one, 
the two-tailed student t-test37 is used which tests the null hypothesis that the mean of the 
                                                 
34 Bucheim, A. et al (2001), p. 28. 
35 ROA is defined as ratio  of EBITDA to total assets 
36 Rüdisüli,R., Amden, SG. (2005), p.128. 
37 see section 3.2.1, where the student t-test is explained 
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paired differences of the two samples (here: two different time periods) is zero. In order 
to test the statistical significance of the change in median operating performance the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test is applied. According to Barber and Lyon 
(1996) the nonparametric test statistics are more powerful than parametric t-statistics for 
comparing two populations. It tests the null hypothesis that two populations have 
identical distribution functions. The alternative hypothesis states that the two 
populations have different distribution functions with respect to their median (location). 
The Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test does not require an assumption of a specific 
distribution, such as the normal distribution. Usually it is applied in place of the two 
sample t-test in case where the normality assumption is questionable.38 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Easton, V. J., McColl, J. H., Statistics Glossary, www.stats.gla.ac.uk, retrieved 17.04.2012 
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4. Data Analysis & Results 
This section provides the results of the sample analysis using the stock market effect 
event methodology (Section 4.1. and 4.2.) and the operating performance event 
methodology (Section 4.3.). 
4.1. Results of short-term stock market effects analysis 
Table 8 represents the averaged abnormal returns (ARs) with the relative t-test 
statistic values and the averaged cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the European 
parent firms. The results are obtained by using the Market Model for the event time 
period [-10,+10], where day 0 is the announcement day.  
  
Table 8: Results of Market Model approach 
Event window AR % t-statistic CAR% 
-10 -0.841% -1.590 -0.841% 
-9 -0.052% -0.094 -0.893% 
-8 -0.363% -0.657 -1.256% 
-7 -0.104% -0.188 -1.359% 
-6 0.012%  0.021 -1.347% 
-5 -0.024% -0.043 -1.371% 
-4 -0.154% -0.280 -1.526% 
-3 0.005%  0.009 -1.521% 
-2 -0.260% -0.471 -1.780% 
-1 0.265%  0.479 -1.516% 
0 1.371% 2.485*** -0.145% 
1 0.126% 0.229 -0.018% 
2 -0.348% -0.630 -0.366% 
3 0.093%  0.169 -0.273% 
4 -0.469% -0.851 -0.742% 
5 -0.081% -0.146 -0.823% 
6 -0.059% -0.106 -0.882% 
7 -0.504% -0.913 -1.385% 
8 -0.379% -0.686 -1.764% 
9 1.408%  2.552*** -0.356% 
10 -0.247% -0.447 -0.603% 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 2%(***). 
 
As shown in Table 8, parent firms experience a highly significant positive abnormal 
return of approximately 1.37 % on the day of announcement. It is also the highest 
occurred abnormal return over the event window. In addition, a highly significant 
positive abnormal return is observable in the first nine days after the carve-out 
announcement. Both significant positive returns are different from zero on a confidence 
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level of 99%. This positive market reaction of the equity carve-out announcement 
symbolizes a value creation for parent`s shareholders. Also the one day prior and post 
the carve-out announcement denotes positive abnormal returns. Nevertheless, regarding 
the CARs over the 20-day period there is a small decrease of approximately 0.6 % in the 
expected parent stock price under the market model observable. 
  
Additionally to Table 8, the calculated averaged abnormal returns of the entire 
sample, 60 parent firms, using the Market Model for the announcement period are 
outlined in Figure 4. A plot of averaged abnormal returns is depicted for the 20 days 
surrounding the announcement date showing the results graphically. 
 
Figure 4: Averaged Abnormal Returns by the Market Model approach 
 
 
On the first glance it is apparent, that European parent firms fare poorly regarding 
their stock performance before the equity carve-out announcement. Obviously the 
announcement of equity carve-outs conveys a significant part of useful information for 
the market valuation of the parent firms. The information processing and market 
revaluation happens after the event day as indicated by Figure 4. In the previous day 
around the announcement date there is a clear increase until day 0. Therefore, it is clear 
that the announcement of the subsidiaries initial public offering has a relevant positive 
effect on parent stock price. In the subsequent eight days around the announcement date 
there is a clear decrease where parent firms earn negative returns in average. The 
significant increase of significant abnormal returns on the announcement day is clearly 
observable. Also Figure 5, shows evidence on the positive stock market reaction of 
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carve-out announcements by plugging the CARs of the parents for the event window [-
10,+10].  
 
Figure 5: CARs by Market Model 
 
 
Table 9 outlined the corresponding results to Figure 5. There is a highly significant 
positive CAR of 1.64% for carve-outs over the two-day period on a confidence level of 
98% and a significant positive CAR of 1.76% over the three-days period on a 
confidence level of 95%. The positive and significant abnormal returns in the event 
window (-1,+1) seem to be driven by the averaged abnormal return of the 
announcement date. 
 
Table 9: Announcement period CARs by Market Model 
Interval CAR % t-statistic 
CAR (-10 ,+10) -0.603% -0.249 
CAR (-10, -1) -1.516% -0.906 
CAR (+1,+10) -0.458% -0.274 
CAR (-5,+5)  0.703%  0.299 
CAR (-5, -1) -0.168% -0.142 
CAR (+1, +5) -0.679% -0.574 
CAR (-1, +1)  1.762%  1.923** 
CAR (-1, 0)  1.636%  2.186*** 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*),  
5% (**) and 2%(***). 
 
The Market Model Abnormal Returns are supporting the findings of previous 
European research studies. The CAR over the three-days window (-1,+1) is in line with 
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the findings of Langenbach (2001) documenting 1.4% CAR over the same period. 
Gibbs (2000) find a higher, but also significant positive, CAR for 47 equity carve-outs 
occurring between 1999 and 2000 of 2.5%. The results of this research paper also 
supports some findings of documented in literature for US data such as Klein, 
Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991), Hand and Skantz (1998), Allen and McConnel (1998), 
Chemmanur and Paegalis (2000), Haushalter and Mikkelson (2001) and Vijh (2002), 
where later has a very broad sample not really comparable with the present working 
sample.  
 
The Market Adjusted Model daily results are not exactly consistent with the Market 
Model daily results. The calculated abnormal returns by the second applied model are 
not highly statistically significant which differs from the results obtained by the Market 
Model where average abnormal returns of the announcement date are statistically 
significant on a confidence level of 99%. The difference can be explained by the 
characteristics of the Market Adjusted Model. It assumes that the expected return on a 
security for a given time period is predicted only by the return on the market index for 
the same time period. The Market Adjusted Model provides an average abnormal return 
on the announcement date of 0.99%, which is statistically significant on a confidence 
level of 90%. 
 
Table 10: Announcement period CARs by Market Adjusted Model 
Interval CAR % t-statistic 
CAR (-10 ,+10) -4.819% -1.942** 
CAR (-10, -1) -3.898% -2.276*** 
CAR (+1,+10) -1.910% -1.115 
CAR (-5,+5) -1.153% -1.021 
CAR (-5, -1) -1.385% -1.143 
CAR (+1, +5) -1.439% -1.189 
CAR (-1, +1)  1.227%  1.309* 
CAR (-1, 0)  1.180%  1.541* 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*),  
5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
Table 10 shows highly significant negative CARs for equity carve-outs of 
approximately - 4.20% over the entire event period of 20 days on a confidence level of 
95% and a higher significant negative CAR of -3.90% over the event window [-10,-1] 
on a confidence level of 99%. According the announcement effect, CAR (-1,+1) and 
CAR (-1,0), there are significant positive CARs of approximately 1.23% and 1.18% 
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respectively on a confidence level of 90% observable. By comparing the results for the 
same announcement periods, both model provide similar positive results according the 
value creation of carve-outs announcement for parent firms but the Market Model 
shows higher statistically significant CARs. Nevertheless, there is an empirical evidence 
that the announcement of an equity carve-out as restructuring tool creates value for the 
divesting parent firms.  
 
In Figure 6, a plot of average CARs is depicted for the 20 days surrounding the 
announcement date. In average there is a poorly stock performance of the 60 parent 
firms observable, demonstrated by the negative CARs over the 20-days. Regarding the 
graph, the announcement of carve-outs obviously conveys a significant proportion of 
information for the market valuation of parent firms and increases the information 
available to all public companies. This can be shown by the clear and strong increase of 
parent stock price at the date of announcement.  
 
Figure 6: CARs by Market Adjusted Model 
 
 
Moreover, it seems that the market revaluation occurs immediately before and after 
the announcement date. Parent stocks begin to create value by the increase of stock 
prices two days before day zero from -4.09% to 2.91%, stay constant immediately after 
the announcement day and decline then. In the subsequent nine days there is a clear 
increase from -5.71% to -4.82%, which let conclude that the parent stock get revaluated 
by the market after the announcement day.  
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By comparing the empirical results of both applied models, there are higher 
significant findings by using the Market Model approach. However, both show evidence 
on the positive market reaction of carve-out announcements which supports empirical 
findings of several previous research studies as outlined before. 
  
The significant carve-out announcements on European parent` stock performance 
can be explained by the reduced information asymmetries and by the optimism 
separating subsidiary`s business from parent`s activity into two entities that can be 
valued by the market independently. Also few days after the transaction parent stock 
increase in value. In fact, the announcement of a carve-out is received by the market as 
good news based on the empirical results of this paper. It is striking that European firms 
who choose to divest are generally underperforming, which can confirm the motive and 
reasons for an equity carve-out decision outlined in the previous sections. By focusing 
on their own business and reducing information asymmetries to name a few, parent 
firms seems to be motivated for selling their wholly owned subsidiary in order to create 
shareholders value and to improve company`s efficiency.  
 
After examining the short-term announcement effects of European carve-outs 
focusing on parent firms, the following section provides the results on the long-term 
stock market analysis.  
4.2. Results of long-term stock market effects analysis 
Table 11 represent the results of the long-term stock market performance showing 
that there are highly significant BHARs for carve-outs over all event windows. 
 
Table 11: Post-carve-out buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
    
Month (+1 , +6) Month (+1 , +12) Month (+1 , +24) 
BHAR -16.60% -33.67% 39.11% 
t-statistic -3.38*** -4.13*** 3.12*** 
Parent sample N= 59 N=54 N=46 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
The parent sample differs for each event window because there are no available 
historical stock performance for some parent in the following months and years after the 
equity carve-outs. Obviously, parent firms fare poorly in the month following the carve-
out. For the first two periods parents earn negative BHARs, significant on the 
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confidence level of 99%. In the twelve months after the event parents perform worst 
earning a highly significant average BHAR of -33.67%. This changes drastically in the 
subsequent year. Table 9 shows highly significant positive BHARs of 39.11% in the 
two-year window after the carve-out event. Specifically, in the first year the findings 
represent an evidence of long-term underperformance. According to that findings carve-
outs do not necessarily lead to efficiency improvement. The results contrast with Vijh 
(1999), who does not find evidence of the underperformance in the long-run after the 
carve-out. The results support Gleason, Madura and Pennathur (2006) who document a 
significant strong underperformance for all three periods, specifically in the following 
18 months afterwards. The lowest earned post-carve-out BHAR occurred in the 18 
months following the carve-out of -25.65%.  
 
Regarding the two-years period there is an evidence of long-term overperformance. 
Holders of parent`s stock earn a highly significant BHAR of 39.11% on a confidence 
level of 99%. Therefore, it cannot be concluded for all long-time horizons that a carve-
out does not lead to efficiency improvement. The results suggest that after a two-year 
period carve-outs conduct for value creation. The drastically increase about 200% from 
BHAR (+1,+12) to BHAR(+1,+24) , or well the change from the negative BHAR to 
positive BHAR is highly significant and unprecedented. This result represents a new 
empirical finding analyzing the long-term effects of equity carve-outs documented in 
research studies which analyzes long-term effects on US and European data. 
4.3. Results of long-term operating performance analysis 
In the context of the explanation for value creation of carve-outs the following 
results of parents operating performance in the three-years around the carve-out 
transaction show the existence of abnormal changes operating performance measures. 
Table 12 and 13 report the results of the profitability analysis for the parent in the three-
years period surround the equity carve out. In order to evaluate parent`s profitability in 
respect to the carve-out transaction, Table 12 presents the abnormal changes of ROA 
from the year prior to, to the year after the transaction. Parent firms increase their 
profitability over the investigated time period. The mean (median) ROA of parent firms 
increases from 4.4% (3.17 %) in the year -1 to 9.17% (3.63 %) two years later. In the 
year of transaction, year 0, the mean (median) ROA is 5.41% (4.34 %). The ROA 
measures is influenced by the following factors: Profit for the financial year, sales and 
 39 
 
total assets.39 In other words ROA can be split into the profit margin and the asset 
turnover showing the reasons of an increase of ROA. The increase in sale, while 
lowering expenses, followed by the equity carve-out transaction causes an increased 
ROA as shown in Table 12 in the year of transaction. The positive abnormal change of 
ROA over the entire period investigated assumes that parent firms control their costs in 
order to not exceed their revenues, which supports a continued improvement of 
profitability over the three-years period. 
  
Table 12: Return on Assets (ROA) 
ROA -1 0 1 
Mean (in %) 4.438 5.421 9.169 
Median (in %) 3.172 4.335 3.635 
Observation 56 57 49 
ROA  (-1, 0) (0, 1) (-1 +1) 
Mean differences (in %) 0.984 3.748 4.731 
p- value 0.631 0.453 0.363 
Median differences (in %) 1.163 -0.701 0.463 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.339 0.879 0.454 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
The second profitability measure shows also an improvement over the investigated 
time period. Table 13 presents the mean (median) ROE of carve-out parents which 
increases drastically from 13.84% (5.93%) in the year prior the transaction to 41.31% 
(15.65 %) in the year of the transaction. Parent firms improve their profitability also one 
year later to 58.04% (13.16%). The abnormal change of median ROE is significant on a 
confidence level of 95% for the event period [-1,0] and over the entire investigated 
period [-1,+1]. ROE is the basic measure of firm`s efficiency. According to the DuPont 
System ROE depends on cost control, the ability of assets to produce sales and leverage, 
where the later one is defined as total assets to equity.40 In fact, the benefit shown in 
Table 13 can also be derived from the dividend on sold shares or from a combination of 
dividends and reinvestment in the company.  
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Table 13: Return on Equity (ROE) 
ROE (in %) -1 0 1 
Mean (in %) 13.836 41.308 58.042 
Median (in %) 5.926 15.647 13.162 
Observation 55 56 47 
ROE (-1, 0) (0, 1) (-1 +1) 
Mean differences (in %) 27.472 16.734 44.206 
p- value 0.335 0.742 0.319 
Median differences (in %) 9.721** -2.485 7.236** 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.005 0.502 0.016 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
The results of these profitability measures lead to the conclusion that carve-out 
parents improve their profitability in the long-run, although the abnormal changes of 
ROA are not statistically significant. 
  
According the third measure of operating profitability is based on firm`s operating 
cash flow. EBITDA is earning measure which is of particular interest for companies 
with large amount of fixed assets including high depreciation charges.  
 
Table 14: EBITDA 
EBITDA -1 0 1 
Mean (in €m) 592.680 283.759 369.348 
Median (in €m) 6.293 2.640 3.583 
Observation 51 52 45 
EBITDA (-1, 0) (0, 1) (-1 +1) 
Mean differences (in €m) -308.921 85.590 -223.332 
p- value 0.618 0.8368 0.7514 
Median differences (in €m) -3.654 0.944 -2.710 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.114 0.454 0.355 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
Table 15 shows that the mean (median) EBITDA of parent firms declines from 
592.68 (6.29) million Euros in year -1 to 283.76 (2.64) million Euros in year 0. In the 
subsequent year parents increase their EBITDA to 369.348 (3.583) million Euros. 
Nevertheless, in the three-year period they document negative, not significant, abnormal 
changes of -223.33 (-2.710) million Euros.  
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The following table documents the changes of asset growth for the investigated 
period. The negative mean abnormal change from year -1 of 21.07% to year 0 of 4.77% 
is evident in respect to the equity carve-out. This abnormal change is statistically 
significant on confidence level of 95%. In the year after the transaction parent increase 
their asset growth rate to 12.53%. 
 
Table 15: Asset growth 
Asset growth -1 0 1 
Mean (in %) 21.068 4.765 12.530 
Median (in %) 0.216 7.672 3.620 
Observation 52 55 46 
Asset growth (-1, 0) (0, 1) (-1 +1) 
Mean differences (in %) -16.303** 7.765 -8.538 
p- value 0.040 0.212 0.323 
Median differences (in %) 7.456 -4.053 3.404 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.077 0.147 0.601 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
In the context of the fund raising hypothesis as main motive for conducting carve-
out, Table 16 present the abnormal changes of leverage for the parent firm over the 
three-years period. According to the outlined results, the financing strategy hypothesis, 
as defined by Vijh (2002), is supporting evidence in the carve-out sample, although 
there is no significance found. 
  
Table 16: Total Debt/ Total Assets 
TOTAL DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS -1 0 1 
Mean (in %) 168.168 26.076 28.744 
Median (in %) 26.100 25.754 25.196 
Observation 48 53 45 
TOTAL DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS (-1, 0) (0, 1) (-1 +1) 
Mean differences (in %) -142.092 2.668 -139.425 
p- value 0.296 0.461 0.345 
Median differences (in %) -0.346 -0.558 -0.904 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.841 0.564 0.620 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). 
 
The mean (median) total debt to total assets decreases substantially from the year 
prior to the transaction, 161.17% (26.10%), to the year of transaction, 26.08% (25.75%) 
supporting that debt decreases considerably. Throughout the entire event period [-1,+1] 
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parents decreases drastically their leverage, as shown by the negative mean differences 
(median differences) of -139.43% (-0.90%). This abnormal change symbolizes a source 
of value creation and supposes, by considering the high total debt to total asset ratio in 
the year prior the transaction, that fund raising is a key motive for conducting the equity 
carve-out. According abnormal decrease in the two-year period, (-1,0), it can be 
explained that the European parent firms used the cash proceeds raised by carve-out 
transactions to pay down debt. Moreover, the funds raised allow to finance the growth 
of either firm, reducing the need to assume additional debt which represents the equity 
carve-out as financing source. Therefore, parents bring efficiencies to their respective 
balance sheet because of the carve-out. 
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5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the valuation effects occurring by equity 
carve-outs in Europe. Motivated by the fact that European corporate restructuring 
referring to equity carve-outs is not broadly investigated, this paper examines the 
valuation effects of 60 equity carve-outs taking place between 1998 and 2011 in Europe, 
where the focus of the analysis lies on the parent firms. The most carve-out transactions 
tool place in the United Kingdom and Germany. 
 
The recent research study demonstrates that parent firms can enhance their value 
when carving-out units. According to the results of the stock market analysis, the 
findings found evidence in the short-run as well as in the long-run. Applying the Market 
Model Parent firms experience a highly significant abnormal return of 1.37% on the day 
of announcement. Moreover, the valuation effects occurred by the equity carve-out are 
evident concerning the highly positive CAR(-1,0) and the CAR(-1,+1) (using the 
Market Model). The findings in the short-run stock market based on the announcement 
date supports the empirical findings of Langenbach (2001), Gibbs (2000), Klein, 
Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991), Shipper and Smith (1986), Allen and McConnel (1998), 
Chemmanur and Paegalis (2000), to name a few. Although, the results obtained by 
applying the Market Adjusted Model daily are not exactly consistent with the Market 
Model daily results, by comparing for the same announcement period, models provide 
similar significantly positive results. In comparison the Market Model shows higher 
significant CARs, which can be explained by the differences of both models taking in 
consideration the simplicity of the Market Adjusted Model. However, there is found 
empirical evidence for the value creation of the carve-out announcement. This value 
creation can be explained by the sources of value creation outlined by Hennings (1995): 
the reduced information asymmetries and the optimism separating subsidiary`s business 
from parent`s activity into two entities that can be valued by the market independently. 
According to the empirical results, the market revaluation occurs immediately before 
and after the announcement date. In fact, the announcement of an equity carve-out 
appears to be received by the market as good news. Moreover, the stock market analysis 
on the short-run shows that European parent firms fare generally poorly, which let 
assumes that by focusing on their own business and by reducing information 
asymmetries parent firms seems to be motivated for selling their wholly owned 
subsidiary in order to create shareholders value and improve company`s efficiency.  
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The long-term stock market findings contrast with Vijh (1999), who does not find 
evidence of the underperformance in the long-run after the carve-out. In contrary, this 
thesis documents highly significant BHARs on a confidence level of 99% over all 
investigated event windows. Throughout the first year following the carve-out parent 
firms earn a significant negative BHAR which assumes that carve-out transaction do not 
lead to efficiency improvement and do not create value at all. Despite of this, there are 
results showing a drastically abnormal change of approximately 200% in the following 
year leading to a significant positive BHAR. The results of the first two investigated 
event windows support Gleason, Madura and Pennathur (2006) who document a 
significant strong underperformance for all three periods, specifically in the following 
18 months afterwards. In respect to the long-term overperformance in the two-years 
period, this thesis provides a new empirical finding. Because of the drastically increase 
from BHAR (+1,+12) to BHAR(+1,+24) it cannot infer that an equity carve-out does 
not create value.  
 
In the context of long-term operating performance, parent firms increase their 
profitability over the investigated period. Positive abnormal changes in ROA over the 
entire three-years event period suppose that parent firms increase their profitability by 
the IPO of the subsidiary (increase in sale) and by controlling their costs in order not to 
exceed their revenues. The findings of this paper according the abnormal changes in 
ROA are not in line with the findings of Michaely and Shaw (1995) examining the long-
term operating performance on US-data.  
 
Foremost, the significant abnormal change in median ROE from the year prior and 
the year after the transaction confirm that parent improve their efficiency in the long-
run. This benefit in ROE can be derived by the dividend on sold subsidiary shares in the 
framework of the subsidiary`s IPO, and/ or from a combination of dividends and 
reinvestment in the company. 
 
The changes of parent`s leverage, supports that fund raising is an important reason 
for conducting carve-outs, as it is supported by Allen an McConnel (1998), Vijh (2002) 
and Frank and Harden (2001). According to the abnormal decrease in the two-year 
period European parents seem to use the cash proceeds raised by carve-out transactions 
to pay down debt. This supports the hypothesis that crave-out transactions are used as 
financial source. The funds raised allow to finance the growth of either firm, reducing 
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the need to assume additional debt which represents the equity carve-out as financing 
source. Summing up the findings of the operating performance analysis, carve-out 
parents are more profitable and more efficient resulting by the carve-out transaction.  
 
Due to the fact that the recent research focus exclusively on the analysis of carve-out 
parents, there are possibilities to expand the empirical analysis. Future expansion of this 
paper can include subsidiaries long-term effect analysis as well as the analysis of IPO 
return in the short-term horizon such as the average first-day return. It will be 
interesting to see whether parent firms choose to carve-out a unit because the subsidiary 
results to be more profitable and represent higher growth than the own parents, as 
shown by the empirical findings of Schipper and Smith (1986), Allen (1998a), Powers 
(2001) and Frank and Harden (2001).The authors also conclude that equity carve-outs 
are used as financial source. In the case where European subsidiaries show growth 
opportunities, one key motive for parents to conduct carve-outs could be to finance the 
growth opportunities of the subsidiaries, which supports the use of carve-out 
transactions as financial source. Future expansion of the present research can include a 
model examining the reduction of information asymmetries between the subsidiary and 
actors in the capital markets, as applied by Langenbach (2000). Moreover, from 
particular interest will be a thorough operating analysis for both parties, parent and 
subsidiary firm, in order to examine the impact of the equity carve-out in the long-term 
horizon. 
 
Furthermore, it will be interesting to see whether carve-out parents continue in the 
future to create value in the long-term stock market, taking in consideration that a 
significant part of the sample contains equity carve-out transaction occurring in 2010 
and 2011.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Equity Carveout Flag: Yes/No flag set to 'Y' when the transaction is an Equity 
Carveout. In an Equity Carveout, the new company´s shares are distributed or sold to 
the public via an IPO. Equity Carveouts are tracked only if they represent 100% or more 
of the unit, subsidiary division or other company. However an Equity Carveout of any 
size is tracked if it is a Privitization. Equity Carveouts are not included in TR?s 
published M&A Rankings. 
 
